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ABSTRACT
Like in many preventive activities, the effectiveness of a risk policy
is hard to measure. The objective of this article is to represent the
methodology of monitoring a risk management policy. We use
the Markov chain methodology for the calculation of the key risk
indicators (K.R.I.s) of the process. Observing them through time, it
is possible to conclude the positive attitude of the risk-preventing
measures undertaken on the observed process. The methodology
is represented in the case of archaeological excavations.
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In order to better manage future incidents, each company must be able to capitalise
on previous mistakes (Mouatassim & Ibenrissoul 2015). In this spirit, the enterprise
risk management (E.R.M.) is implemented and becoming more and more popular
(Dumicic, Cizmesija, Pavkovic, & Andabaka, 2006; Sprcic, Tekavcic, & Sevic, 2008;
Saudah, Chew, & McManus, 2014; Kozarevic & Besic 2015; Daud, Yazid, & Hussin,
2010; Gorzen-Mitka, 2013; Ahmad, Ng, & McManus, 2014). Since the mid 1970 s, its
concept has expanded from manufacturing organisations and been adopted by the
public sector (Drennan & McConnell, 2007; Schiller & Prpich 2014).
Daud et al. (2010) expose that, under the E.R.M. term, many different things are
understood. This article is oriented to deal with the risk connected to the process, as
Ciocoiu and Dobrea (2010) wrote, the ‘mitigating process’ or ‘risks of busi-
ness processes’.
Two challenges initiated this article. The first one is the fact that the I.S.O. 31000,
31000 (2009) standard, in its Section 5.6, requires the monitoring and review of the
risk management. The second one is tightly connected to the first one. The fact is,
that I.S.O. does not give any methodology or solution how to do that. Therefore, no
wonder that John Loxley has written that ‘while publications all call for risk to be
measured, the majority of them do not indicate how that might be done’ (Loxley,
2010, p. 70).
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Many articles about risk management use the method of Failure Modes and an
Effects (Criticality) Analysis (F.M.E.[C.]). This is one of the most proactive methods
of risk management (Yong et al., 2018; Borkovic, Milcic, & Donevski, 2017; Erbıyık,
Can, & Kuşçu, 2014). In our research, we want to establish the mechanism which
enables the supervision of risk management successfulness. We developed the key
risk indicators (K.R.I.s) through which a risk process might be monitored and super-
vised. It is represented in archaeological excavations.
Several articles prove that risk management in the museum sphere is necessary.
Tetreault (2008) reports on the enormous damage to Canadian cultural heritage insti-
tutions. Kuzucuoglu (2014), in his article, reports two in the year 2010, and even five
death cases in the year 2011 in Turkish libraries, archives and museums. There are
some warnings given about digging (Patterson, 2013; similar SWA 2015) without fol-
lowing a risk methodology and the K.R.I.s calculation. With the implementation of
the proper risk treatments, we expect to minimise risk event occurrences and alleviate
the consequences when they occurred. Comparing K.R.I.s over time shows the suc-
cessfulness of the risk policy.
The meaning of the importance of risk management exposes Bosilj Vuksic, Brkic,
and Tomicic-Pupek (2018) to define that, besides strategic alignment, top manage-
ment support, a process-oriented structure, process performance measurement and
other social aspects, it should become one of the critical success factors in the adop-
tion of business process management software.
2. Literature overview
K.R.I.s are similar to the key performance indicators (K.P.I.s) and are often mistaken
for these. While the K.P.I.s are focused on the historical process performance, the
K.R.I.s are oriented towards future threats (Scarlat, Chirita, & Bradea, 2012; Beasley,
Branson, & Hancock, 2010). Coleman (2009) defines K.R.I.s as statistics or measure-
ments that can provide a perspective of a company’s risk position. The goal of devel-
oping effective K.R.I.s, is to identify the relevant metrics that provide useful insights
into potential risks that may have an impact on the organisation’s objectives (Beasley
et al., 2010).
It is beneficial to measure them over time in order to detect trends and provide
contextual information (Davies, Finlay, McLenaghen, & Wilson, 2006; as well as
Coleman, 2009; Frigo & Anderson 2011; Beasley et al., 2010). Scandizzo (2005) also
highlighted the importance of the establishment of a database of quantitative informa-
tion that can be used to model the operational risk profile of the organisation, as well
as to guide management action in both corrective and preventive terms.
K.R.I.s can be reduced in two ways: by decreasing the probability that the risk
event occurs, or by minimising the consequences. Analysing the impact of the risk
event occurrence or its probability, and consequently its effect and therefore its
weight in the process, can be found in articles dealing with multi-criterion decision
making (M.C.D.M.). Gigovic et al. (2017) implement their own methodology for a
geographical information system for a flood in an urban area, Roy et al. (2018) intro-
duced the D.E.M.A.T.E.L. model for the key success factors with the aim to control
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hospital service quality management. An interesting variety of ranking methods can
be found in Mukhametzyanov and Pamucar (2018) and Komazec, Mladenovic, and
Dabizljevic (2018).
For the calculation method, we have followed the principle that simple methods
do not provide precise solutions, while complicated ones require too much effort and
time (Golubovic et al., 2018). The processes are able to transit from one state to
another, under the influence of many factors (Ginevicius, Trishch, & Petraskevicius,
2015). These transitions can be represented through different techniques, such as text
descriptions, various diagrams, graphs, etc. One of them is a presentation through
matrix form. We have chosen this because it is the basis for using Markov chains as
a method for the calculation of the K.R.I.s. This method is also one of the techniques
for risk assessment suggested by the I.S.O. 31010, 31010 (2009) standard. It is classi-
fied under the code B.24. The Markov chain model is one of the most widely used
probabilistic models, because of its simplicity and ability to model various types of
phenomena (Skulj, 2009). An increasing number of implementations of Markov
chains are recorded, such as student progress in the case of Alawadhi and Konsowa
(2010), Adeleke, Oguntuase, and Ogunsakin (2014) and Brezavscek et al. (2017).
Gurning and Cahoon (2009) use it in marine transport, as do Faghih-Roohi, Xie, and
Ng (2014), etc.
3. Methodology used
3.1. The development of the key risk indicators
With the aim of establishing a system of risk management, we have strictly followed
the steps regulated by IS.O. .31000, which arose, based on the AS 4360:2004 standard
(ISHN [Industrial Sagety & Hygiene News], 2017; same Leitch, 2010). We prefer this
to the C.O.S.O. E.R.M. (Frigo & Anderson 2011; Rittenberg & Martens 2012; Curtis
& Carey 2012). The main reason is because, since 2015, it has been included in the
I.S.O. 9001 standard (Medic, Karlovic, & Cindric, 2016; Koubek, 2015; Shuff, 2015;
Wawak, 2015). The Public Risk Management Association has also placed more
emphasis on the I.S.O. (PERI, 2010). Gjerdrum and Peter (2011) find that there is
more in common between C.O.S.O. and I.S.O. than in opposition (similar Bosetti,
2015). Figure 1 presents the main part of the standard.
For our research, we have defined the probability or the frequency for each risk
event in the process of archaeological excavations. For each risk event, we have also
estimated its consequences (in the phase 5.4.4 Risk evaluation). Every risk case was
estimated by minimum and maximum effects. In the next section counter measures
were prepared.
I.S.O. 31000 requires ensuring that the controls are effective and efficient. They
need to obtain further information for improving the risk assessment, analysing
events, changes, trends, etc. (I.S.O. 31000, 31000 2009). Similar demands I.S.O. 31004
(2013) where stands, that there should be a comprehensive programme in place to
monitor and record risk performance indicators. To fulfil the requirements, we have
developed the K.R.I.s for this process. For our process, we have defined the follow-
ing metrics:
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 First and most important is the cost of the risk event in terms of time. Generally,
archaeological excavations start when an investor requests permission to build an
object in a certain territory, and the corresponding ministry expresses interest in
an investigation for research. The archaeologists get a narrow timeframe in which
they have to complete their work. In most cases, this time is 35 working days. The
majority of risk events consume some of this valuable time.
 The second indicator measures the number of people involved in the event.
 For the third indicator, we measured the direct expenditure that the event caused.
 The fourth K.R.I. is the overall costs that cover the time duration, involved work-
ers, plus direct costs.
Every indicator was estimated from a minimum and maximum perspective. For
example, the theft of equipment can cause zero time loss if the damage is not worth
speaking of. This means that the expenditure is less than 50 EUR and is not worth
reporting to the police. The second option is that the theft is reported to the police,
but they do not start an investigation at the site. In this case, one man loses one or
two hours preparing an announcement and communication with the police. In the
third case, if the damage is serious, the police start an investigation and search for
biological traces. In such a case, all (on average 20) workers stop their tasks for two
to four hours, until the police finish their activities.
3.2. The calculation method
In Markov analysis, a process can be considered as a collection of variables X0, X1,
… Xn. Each Xi is interpreted as the state of the system at the time i. The number of
states is finite and the number N represents the number of states in which the system
can be found. There also exists the set of numbers Pii, where i,j¼ 1 … N, represent-
ing the probability that the system in state i will transfer to the next state, into state j.
The collection {Xn, n 0} constitutes the Markov chain. Some states are transition
states. This means that they transform the process from one state to another. Other
states are absorbing. When the system reaches any of the absorbing states, it remains
in the absorbing state forever.























Figure 1. Risk treatment process.
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Generally, a discrete event process is represented in a matrix form as:
P ¼ Q R
0 1
 
Where Q is a matrix of the transient states. These are the states of the system that
the process will never return to; R is the matrix representing transitions from transi-
ent to absorbing states; I represents the identity matrix and 0 represents the
zero matrix.
To achieve the goal of our research, we need to calculate the expected average
number of occurrences of individual transition states before absorption. The absorp-
tion in our case is the ending of the project. We calculated this through the funda-
mental matrix N. The equation for the fundamental matrix is:
N ¼ ðI – QÞ1
Identity matrix I in our case is a matrix of the same size as the matrix of the tran-
sient states Q, for which the following holds true: p(i,j) ¼ 1 for i¼ j and p(i,j) ¼ 0 for
i 6¼ j. The mathematical proof and explanation is given in Hudoklin Bozic (1999) and
Beichelt (2006).
We will multiply the average occurrences of the individual state with the impact of
the state either for the minimum and maximum expected lost time, involved workers
or costs.
4. The implementation of the RISK management in the process
of archaeological excavation
We got the basic data about what was going wrong and how often it happened from
the archaeological archive and from workers employed on these excavations. For
activity 5.4.2 – Risk identification (see Figure 1), the archive of all archaeological
researches in the northeast part of our country for the period of 2006-2016 was ana-
lysed. During the stated period, there were 460 excavations. After eliminating the ter-
rain analyses and sounding, we focused on 320 projects. The major statistical data
from the journals and diaries of these excavations show that the most popular dur-
ation of a single excavation was 35 days. On average there were 20 workers employed.
Unfortunately, the documentation from those digs was incomplete and therefore
not useful for the identification of risk events. We collected data about events that
have happened, through interviews with participants. They reported 376 risk events.
We classified them into 48 types. The British Columbia Museums Association listed
four major areas of risk: people, property, funding and community perception (Hall
& Duckles 2005). In our research, oriented on archaeological digging, we identified
five sources of risk events: assets, human factors, location, weather and administra-
tion. Table 1 lists 9 event types out of 48, with 90 event occurrences out of 376. For
each event type, we have recorded the number of occurrences in the third column
under the label Freq.
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In the following text, we present the analysis of the events involving assets only. This
means the risk events coded from AS1 to AS5.
In the next step, according to I.S.O. 31000 – 5.4.3 Risk Analysis (see Figure 1), we
analysed each event that was recognised as a risk event. We treat it as a state in
which the observed process can be placed.
The malfunctioning of a machine was numbered as state no 1. It occurred 14
times. From this state, the system can transfer into one of the following three states:
 Repair in the field, where an end user (operator) eliminates a simple defect. We
have marked this as state no. 2. This happened seven times out of 14.
 Servicing involving the intervention of a specialist – state no 3. This occurred
five times.
 Replacement of the damaged machine – state no 4, which occurred twice.
Every one of these states transfers into the normal state on the next step.
Fire in the aggregate (5) is a simple event. After the occurrence, the system moves
back to its normal state.
Failure of the submersible pump (state 6) happened 11 times. Four times, the end
user (state 2) eliminated the defect without assistance. The remaining times, the
device was replaced (state 4).
Defect in a camera or drone is marked as state no. 7. It transferred to either the
state of self-repair (state 2) or to the state of lost pictures (state 8). The first case hap-
pened six times out of seven occurrences. Pictures were lost one time.
State no. 9 is damage to expensive equipment, such as a theodolite or tachymeter.
In two out of nine cases, the equipment was repaired in the field (state 2), in 6 cases
it was replaced (state 4) and in one case the malfunction was detected too late.
Figure 2 represents a graph of the system states with the probabilities of the
transitions.
In the phase of risk evaluation (5.4.4 – see Figure 1), we estimated the consequen-
ces of each registered event. Every consequence was analysed using three criteria. The
first was the lost hours due to the event occurrence. The second was the estimated
workers involved in the event. The third criterion was the estimated direct costs. We
estimated every criterion through the minimum and maximum impact. For the final
figure, we calculated the overall costs caused by the event occurrence. They were cal-
culated by multiplying the time lost by the workers involved and the event duration,
Table 1. Part of the list of identified risks.
Code Source Freq. Event description Consequences
AS1 Assets 14 Malfunctioning of a work machine Brief repair, servicing or replacement needed
AS2 Assets 1 Fire in the aggregate Worker suffers burns
AS3 Assets 11 Submersible pump malfunction Brief repair or replacement needed
AS4 Assets 7 Defect in a camera or drone Archaeological digging stopped
AS5 Assets 9 Damage to a theodolite or tachymeter Possible insufficient documentation
HF1 Human factor 16 Workers do not respect law and order Inspector warning/fee
HF2 Human factor 11 Wrong usage of tools Worker suffers injury
HF3 Human factor 14 Injury Fracture or dislocation
HF4 Human factor 7 Workers under the influence
of alcohol or drugs
Removal/replacement of the workers
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multiplied by the average hourly cost, plus the direct costs. The average hourly rate
was estimated to be 35 EUR. An example of data risk evaluation is presented in
Table 2.
According to the data from Table 2, malfunctioning of a work machine involves 1
to 2 workers who are occupied for 1 to 2 hours with the defect if they fix it in the
field. It costs between 0 and 50 EUR. Overall, in this case, one to four hours are lost.
It is estimated that one hour of work by one worker costs on average 35 EUR. So the
overall costs are at least 35 EUR (only one worker occupied with the repairs for one
hour), up to a maximum of 330 EUR (two workers occupied for four hours multi-

























































Figure 2. Graph of the system.
Table 2. Part of the list of evaluated risk event consequences.
Time lost Workers involved Direct costs Overall costs
Code State# Event Description min max min max min max min max
AS1 1 Malfunctioning of a work machine
2 Repair in the field 1 2 1 2 0 50 35 330
3 Servicing 2 4 1 2 150 3000 220 3560
4 Replacement 4 8 1 5 100 100 240 7100
AS2 5 Fire in the aggregate 1 1 1 1 5000 5000 5035 5035
AS3 6 Submersible pump malfunction 1 7 1 2 0 50 35 1030
AS4 7 Defect in a camera or drone 1 4 1 1 200 5000 235 5140
8 Lost pictures 0 0 0 0 1000 1000 1000 1000
AS5 9 Damage to a theodolite or tachymeter 1 4 1 1 1000 7500 1035 7640
10 Late discovery 0 0 0 0 0 8000 0 8000
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In this phase (no. 5.5. – see Figure 1), we prepared countermeasures for every
recorded event. For all 48 event types, we prepared 328 proposed actions for risk
avoidance, minimising likelihood, changing the consequences, sharing the risk, etc.
All in the scope of options suggested by the standards. Table 3 presents the example
for event AS2.
5. Monitoring and review
For the presentation of the method of monitoring and review (activity no. 5.6 in
Figure 1), we will focus on events classified as ‘Assets’ in the presented sample in
Table 1 – Part of the List of Identified Risks. They are: Malfunctioning of a work
machine, Fire in the aggregate, Submersible pump malfunction, Defect in a camera or
drone and Damage to a theodolite or tachymeter.
We have formed a process matrix from the data we collected during the risk ana-
lysis. Due to the lack of space dedicated for this article, we decided to use only five
potential accidents in the presentation of the K.R.I. calculation, as mentioned previ-
ously. Overall, they occurred 42 times. During the phase of risk identification (see the
previous Section 4), we recorded 48 threat types that occurred 376 times. Another
very important factor that led to our decision is the fact that the gathered data was
collected, based on the memories of the interviewed workers. The frequencies of each
individual occurrence are therefore not reliable. Our only goal is to represent the
methodology of the K.R.I. calculation.
Every risk occurrence can generate additional steps. For instance, the event type,
malfunctioning of a machine, can take the process into three different states: (1) an
operator can repair the machine, bringing the process into the new state no. 2; (2) an
operator can call for professional servicing, which transfers the process into state 3;
or (3) the machine is replaced by another one – state 4. Therefore, for the selected
sample of five risk events, we have 10 different process states (see Figure 2 – Graph
of the system). We have added two additional states: state 0 (zero), which represents
everything functioning without any problems, and state 11, which is the End
of project.
The process matrix in Table 4 represents the process matrix P for the selected risk
events. In the matrix, there is state no. 11 (end of the project), an absorbing or sink
state. States 0 through 10 are transient states and they form the matrix Q. This means
that we need to exclude state no. 11 from further calculations. 11200 in the
Table 3. Example of countermeasures for event AS2 – fire in the aggregate.
AS2 Fire in the aggregate
Logging of electrical aggregates must be done by an accredited person
Damaged electrical equipment must be replaced immediately
It is forbidden to use the aggregate in a closed area
Casting of the aggregate must be grounded
Before starting the aggregate, all the electrical supplies must be switched off
The exhaust pipe must be at least 7 m away from other objects
In the case of a petrol spill, all the contaminated earth must be removed
Fire appliances must be available at all times
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denominator is the result of the multiplication of the 320 excavations by the average
excavation duration, which is 35 days.
According to the previously stated formula, we have subtracted the matrix of the
transient states Q from identity matrix I and thus get the matrix (I – Q) – see
Table 5. Then we calculated the fundamental matrix (I – Q)1. We did this using
Excel’s field function MINVERSE. The results are presented in Table 6.
In this matrix, we have a balanced distribution of the number of occupied states in
which the process is placed, on average. It shows how many times a certain state
repeats on average, if it started from that certain state. In our case, only the first row
of the matrix is important. Every project starts from the beginning, when everything
is OK.
We can say that the fundamental matrix represents the weight of a single process
state. By multiplying this weight with the estimated lost time, the number of people
involved, and the expenses caused by the accident event, we got the K.R.I.s. They are
calculated in Table 7.
6. Results
The results of our research are presented in Table 7. The columns represent the
observed states. The last one represents the K.R.I.s. The rows are as follows:
 The first row of this table is a copy of the first row in matrix (I-Q)1 in Table 6.
These numbers represent the weight of each individual state of the inci-
dent event.
 The following two rows are the estimated impacts or consequences in terms of the
time spent in each state. The first row represents the minimum estimated time
spent when the process reaches the state and the next one the maximum estimated
time spent. The data is copied from Table 2 – Part of the List of Evaluated Risk
Event Consequences.
 The next two rows represent the minimum and maximum number of involved
workers when the process reaches the state.
 Next are the minimum and maximum direct costs.
 The last two rows summarise the overall costs. The estimated average price per
hour per worker (35 EUR) is multiplied by the number of expected workers
involved in the event and by the number of hours spent if the process reaches
this state.
A similar calculation is performed for the maximum number of wasted hours per
archaeological dig. It gives the exact number 1. Therefore, we conclude that it can be
expected that for an average dig, between 0.366 and one hour will be lost due to nega-
tive events.
The last column of the table represent the K.R.I.s. We have calculated them
as the sum of multiplications of weights for each state by the estimated impacts
or consequences. For example, the average minimum lost time was calculated
as:
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SUMðTimeminimumÞ ¼ ð35  0Þ þ ð0:04375  0Þ þ ð0:059375  1Þ
þ ð0:015625  2Þ þ ð0:046875  4Þ þ
ð0:003125  1Þ þ ð0:034375  1Þ þ ð0:021875  1Þ þ ð0:003125  0Þ
þ ð0:028125  1Þ þ ð0:003125  0Þ ¼ 0:366
The similar calculation is done for the maximum number of wasted hours per
archaeological digging. It gives the exact number 1. Therefore we can conclude that it
can be expected that on average digging it can be expected between 0.366 and 1 hour
will be lost due to the negative events that is expected.
The same calculation has provided the K.R.I.s:
 It can be expected that between 0.209 and 0.506 workers will be lost per archaeo-
logical dig.
 On average, unexpected negative events will cause a loss of between 58 and 430
EUR. The overall costs will be between 71 and 815 EUR per archaeological excava-
tion project.
It is vital to stress that the calculated data is given only for the five selected risk
event types, out of a recorded 48. They represent 42 events out of 376. We have not
calculated all the events, since the data was gathered through interviews with partici-
pating workers. Their memories will have faded over 10 years and therefore the data
is not reliable.
7. Conclusion
Now, we have established a database containing the main entities: the event, where
the risk event is described. as well as the occurrence with a description of the con-
crete event, the consequences and countermeasures with the work assignments. These
are connected to the ongoing projects. The database ensures the strongest possible
anonymity of the data input, so workers are protected concerning any ‘confessed fail-
ures’. From now on, all accidents, risk events and their impacts will be
promptly recorded.
With the aim of observing the K.R.I.s, we recommend that every year, a matrix of
the possible states is developed and the K.R.I.s calculated. The method is simple
Table 6. Fundamental Matrix (I – Q)1.
35 0, 04375 0, 059375 0, 015625 0, 046875 0, 003125 0, 034375 0, 021875 0, 003125 0, 028125 0, 003125
35 1, 04375 0, 559375 0, 372768 0, 189732 0, 003125 0, 034375 0, 021875 0, 003125 0, 028125 0, 003125
35 0, 04375 1, 059375 0, 015625 0, 046875 0, 003125 0, 034375 0, 021875 0, 003125 0, 028125 0, 003125
35 0, 04375 0, 059375 1, 015625 0, 046875 0, 003125 0, 034375 0, 021875 0, 003125 0, 028125 0, 003125
35 0, 04375 0, 059375 0, 015625 1, 046875 0, 003125 0, 034375 0, 021875 0, 003125 0, 028125 0, 003125
35 0, 04375 0, 059375 0, 015625 0, 046875 1, 003125 0, 034375 0, 021875 0, 003125 0, 028125 0, 003125
35 0, 04375 0, 423011 0, 015625 0, 683239 0, 003125 1, 034375 0, 021875 0, 003125 0, 028125 0, 003125
35 0, 04375 0, 916518 0, 015625 0, 046875 0, 003125 0, 034375 1, 021875 0, 145982 0, 028125 0, 003125
35 0, 04375 0, 059375 0, 015625 0, 046875 0, 003125 0, 034375 0, 021875 1, 003125 0, 028125 0, 003125
35 0, 04375 0, 281597 0, 015625 0, 713542 0, 003125 0, 034375 0, 021875 0, 003125 1, 028125 0, 114236
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enough to be used anytime anywhere and only Excel is needed for the calculation. It
is now possible to monitor the quality and effectiveness of the risk management pol-
icy, exactly as expected in the I.S.O. standard.
It is not possible to predict all events that can occur in the observed process. New
events will surprise us all the time. On the other hand, the probabilities of risk occur-
rence are very low. With the aim of eliminating the strong impact of new events on
the K.R.I.s, we suggest observing them through calculations based on a three-
year period.
Disclosure statement
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